D. Kent Wright v. Kenneth D. Lawson : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
2001
D. Kent Wright v. Kenneth D. Lawson : Brief of
Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Parsons, Kruse and Crowther; Attorneys for Defendants.
Hanson and Garrett; Attorneys for Plaintiffs.
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Wright v. Lawson, No. 13719.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc2/879
RECEIVED 
TAW IIBRARYj 
I N T H E
 DEC 5 1975 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 3RSG:1AM Y0UN6 UN,VERS,TY 
: Reuben Clark Law School 
STATE OF UTAH 
D. KENT WRIGHT, GERALD A. 
VAN MONDFRANS, PHILLIP K. 
EVANS, and HUGH J. HINTZE, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
KENNETH D. LAWSON, RAY M. 
UNRATH, LEONARD F. ZALLER, 
JAMES E. M I T C H E L L , and 
MICHAEL STECHLEY, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
13719 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
Appeal from Summary Judgment of the Third Distract 
Court for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
G. Hal Taylor, Presiding. 
PARSONS, KRUSE 
& CROWTHER 
1320 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for 
Defendants-Respondents 
HANSON & GARRETT | r i L„ ! 1, 
520 Continental Bank Building ~ , / -I 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants
 cr; \ s, 
LORRAINE PRESS 1397 SOUTH MAIN STREET SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH PHONE 487.0651 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
THE NATURE OF THE CASE 1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 2 
ARGUMENT 5 
POINT I. A DEMAND LETTER WRITTEN IN 
RELATION TO PENDING LITIGATION 
AND IN CONTEMPLATION OF ADDI-
TIONAL LITIGATION IS AN ABSOLUTELY 
PRIVILEGED PUBLICATION 5 
A. Absolute Privilege In Connection With A 
Judicial Proceeding Is Not Limited To 
Statements Made While A Proceeding Is 
Actually Pending 7 
B. Limitations On Absolute Privilege In Con-
nection With Judicial Proceedings 10 
C. Utah Law Is Not Contrary To The Fore-
going Summary Of Law 12 
D. Application Of Law To The Facts Of This 
Case 14 
POINT II. AN ATTORNEY'S CLIENT IS AC-
CORDED THE SAME PRIVILEGE AS THE 
ATTORNEY IN CONNECTION WITH A 
PENDING OR POSSIBLE ACTION 16 
CONCLUSION 17 
STATUTES CITED 
5A Utah Code Ann. §§45-2-3 and 10 (1953) 13 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued 
Page 
CASES CITED 
Albertson v. Raboff, 46 Cal.2d 375, 295 P.2d 405 
(1956) 7 
Andrews v. Gardiner, 224 N.Y. 440, 121 N.E. 431 
(1918) 16 
Beezley v. Hansen, 4 Utah 2d 64, 286 P.2d 1057 
(1955) 7,8,13 
Dodge v. Henriod, 21 Utah 2d 277, 444 P.2d 753 
(1968) 7 
Fairbanks Pub. Co. v. Francisco, 390 P.2d 784 
(Alaska 1964) 5 
Ginsberg v. Black, 192 F.2d 832 (7th Cix. 1951), 
cert, denied, 343 U.S. 934 (1952) 17 
Hoar v. Wood, 44 Mass. (3 Met.) 193 (1841) 17 
Iverson v. Frandsen, 237 F.2d 898 (10th Cir. 1956) .. 5 
Johnston v. Cartwright, 355 F.2d 32 (8th Cir. 1966).. 8 
Johnston v. Schlarb, 7 Wash. 2d 528, 110 P.2d 190 
(1941) 11 
Laun v. Union Elec. Co., 350 Mo. 572, 166 S.W. 2d 
1065 (1943) 6 
Mills v. Denny, 245 Iowa 584, 63 N.W.2d 222 (1954) 5 
Reliance Ins. Co. v. Hollins, 16 Utah 2d 44, 395 P.2d 
537 (1964) 7 
Rex v. Skinner, Lofft 55, 98 Eng. Rep. 529 (K.B. 
1772) 6 
Richeson v. Kessler, 73 Idaho 548,255 P.2d 707 (1953) 11 
Robinson v. Home Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 242 Iowa 
1120, 49 N.W.2d 521 (1957) 17 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS—Continued 
Plage 
Rodgers v. Wise, 193 S.C. 5, 7 S.E. 2d 517 (1940) .... 8 
Romero v. Prinoe, 85 N.M. 474, 513 P.2d 717 (Ct. 
App. 1973) 14 
Smith v. Hatch, 271 Cal. App. 2d 39, 76 Cal. Rptr. 
350 (1969) 8 
Stewart v. Fahey, 14 Ariz. App. 149, 481 P.2d 519 
(1971) 8 
Stone v. Hutchinson Daily News, 125 Kan. 715, 266 
P. 78 (1928) 7 
Theiss v. Scherer, 396 F.2d 646, 36 ALR 3d 1321 (6th 
Cir. 1968) 14 
Thourot v. Hartnett, 56 N.J. Super. 306,152 A.2d 858 
(1959) 16 
Union Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 83 F.803 (9th 
Cir. 1897) 12 
Western States Title Ins. Co. v. Warnock, 18 Utah 
2d 70, 415 P.2d 316 (1966) 5,8 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
50 Am. Jur. 2d, Libel and Slander §236 10 
Bower, Actionable Defamation (2d ed. 1923) 10 
Developments in the Law-Defamation, 69 Harv. L. 
Rev. 875 (1956) 6,7 
Prosser, Torts (4th ed. 1971) ...10,11,14 
3 Restatement, Torts §§585-589 (1938) 12,14 
Veeder, Absolute Immunity in Defamation, 9 Colum. 
L. Rev. 463 (1909) 5 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
D. KENT WRIGHT, GERALD A. 
VAN MONDFRANS, PHILLIP K. 
EVANS, and HUGH J. HINTZE, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
KENNETH D. LAWSON, RAY M. 
UNRATH, LEONARD F. ZALLER, 
JAMES E. M I T C H E L L , and 
MICHAEL STECHLEY, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
Case No. 
13719 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiffs, all of whom are directors of a corporation, 
brought an Action alleging that a demand letter sent to 
one of the Plaintiffs, the president of the corporation, 
and to the corporation's counsel, by an attorney on be-
half of Defendants, who are shareholders of the corpora-
tion, libels the Plaintiffs. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After the Action was filed, Defendants Kenneth D. 
Lawson and Ray M. Unrath responded by a timely Mo-
tion for Summary Judgment, and, after argument before 
the Lower Court, summary judgment was granted against 
the Plaintiffs on grounds that even if the statements 
complained of were libelous, Defendants and their attor-
ney were privileged to make such statements in connec-
tion with judicial proceedings. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants respectfully request that the decision 
of the Lower Court be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants controvert Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts, 
in that Plaintiffs are required by Rule 75 (p) (2)-(2) (d) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to present the Court 
with "a concise statement of the material facts of the 
case citing the pages of the record supporting such state-
ment." Plaintiffs' Statement of Facts not only does not 
cite the pages of the Record supporting many of its 
allegations, but their Statement alleges immaterial mat-
ters not contained in the Record such as the educational 
background and training of the Plaintiffs and the dates 
and circumstances of corporate matters wholly irrelevant 
to the question of the propriety of the summary adjudi-
cation ordered by the Lower Court. 
The material facts from the Record are as follows: 
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Marketing Systems, Inc. ("MSI") and Com Tel, 
Inc. ("Com Tel") entered into a reorganization agree-
ment providing for the transfer of all MSI shares to 
Com Tel in return for a certain number of Com Tel shares 
and a contingent payout of additional Com Tel shares 
to former MSI shareholders (Record at 14-15). 
Disputes between Com Tel and the former MSI 
shareholders arose concerning the contingent payout of 
Com Tel shares. On August 30, 1973, the former MSI 
shareholders, Defendants herein, brought suit in the 
United States Disitrict Court for the District of Utah 
against Com Tel and the directors of Com Tel, Plain-
tiffs herein, alleging breach of the agreement, unjust 
enrichment, unlawful offer and sale of securities, fraud, 
and misrepresentation involving moral turpitude and cul-
pability (Record at 11-28). 
On September 10, 1973, an annual Shareholders 
Meeting of Com Tel was convened and was attended 
by Kenneth D. Lawson and Ray M. Unrath, former di-
rectors of Com Tel and former MSI shareholders, De-
fendants herein, and two of their attorneys in the fed-
eral suit, John Parsons and James Kruse. Because of 
feelings generated by the law suit, the election of di-
rectors did not proceed beyond the nomination stage, 
the meeting was adjourned "sine die", and no election 
of directors was held (Record at 4-6). 
On September 25, 1973, John Parsons, acting solely 
as counsel for the former MSI shareholders, sent a de-
mand letter by certified mail, return receipt requested, 
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to D. Kent Wright, President of Com Tel and a Plaintiff 
herein, stating that the former MSI shareholders had 
been denied their voting rights at an annual meeting of 
shareholders which had been adjourned and demanding 
reconvention of that meeting, that appropriate informa-
tion regarding the federal law suit be forwarded to share-
hodlers, and that the former MSI shareholders be al-
lowed to forward to all shareholders a statement of their 
position concerning the issues raised by the pending liti-
gation. According to Plaintiffs, a copy of the letter was 
also sent to the corporation's counsel. The letter also 
stated that the actions of Plaintiffs at the meeting were 
"opposed to good morals and against public policy" and 
that appropriate legal relief would be sought if the de-
mands were not met (Record at 2, 4-10). 
On March 9, 1974, the directors of Com Tel filed 
the Complaint herein against the former MSI share-
holders, alleging that the demand letter was a libel of 
the Plaintiffs and held them up to public ridicule and 
scorn (Record at 1-10). On April 26, 1974, Defendants 
Lawson and Unrath moved the Lower Court for Sum-
mary Judgment on the basis that even if the statements 
complained of by Plaintiffs were otherwise libelous, there 
exists an unqualified privilege of an attorney and his 
clients to make such statements in the course of judicial 
proceedings or anticipated judicial proceedings (Record 
at 45-47). The motion was argued before the District 
Court on May 9, 1974, and summary judgment was 
granted (Record at 51). Notice of Appeal was filed on 
June 5, 1974 (Record at 57). 
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ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs' appeal from the summary judgment or-
dered by the Lower Court raises two legal issues: 
1. Was the demand letter written by Defendants' 
attorney a privileged publication? 
2. Are Defendants shielded from liability to Plain-
tiffs for libel because their attorney's letter was privi-
leged? 
POINT I. 
A DEMAND LETTER WRITTEN IN RELA-
TION TO PENDING LITIGATION AND IN 
CONTEMPLATION OF ADDITIONAL LITI-
GATION IS AN ABSOLUTELY PRIVI-
LEGED PUBLICATION. 
When a person's utterances further an interest of 
paramount social importance, that person is given the 
absolute privilege to make defamatory statements which 
would otherwise be actionable. Fairbanks Pub. Co. v. 
Francisco, 390 P.2d 784, 793 (Alasika, 1964). The privi-
lege is a matter of public policy, Iverson v. Frandsen, 
237 F.2d 898, 899 (10th Cir. 1956) (Idaho law), and 
is based upon the necessity of free and open communica-
tion. Mills v. Denny, 245 Iowa 584, 63 N.W.2d 222 
(1954). See also, Western States Title Ins. Co. v. War-
nock, 18 Utah 2d 70, 415 P.2d 316, 318 (1966); Veeder, 
Absolute Immunity in Defamation, 9 Colum. L. Rev. 463, 
465 (1909). 
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Under the common law, absolute privilege was first 
granted to persons taking part in judicial proceedings. 
Developments in the Law — Defamation, 69 Harv. L. 
Rev. 875, 920 (1956). The rule, as stated by Lord Mans-
field, was that "neither party, witness, counsel, jury, or 
Judge, can be put to answer, civilly or criminally, for 
words spoken in office". Rex v. Skinner, Lofft 55, 56, 
98 Eng. Rep. 529, 530 (K. B. 1772). The words had to 
be spoken or written "in office", that is, while the person 
was acting as judge, juror, litigant, witness, or counsel, 
in the performance of the public duty or in the exercise 
of the private right upon which the immunity was based. 
Laun v. Union Elec. Co., 350 Mo. 572, 166 S,W.2d 1065, 
1069 (1943). 
The reason for absolute privilege in a judicial pro-
ceeding is stated by Judge Van Vechten Veeder: 
The absolute immunity of parties litigant 
rests upon the public policy which deems it de-
sirable that all suitors, whether malicious and 
bold, or conscientious and timid, should have 
free access to the conscience of the State with 
whatever complaint they choose to make. This 
is necessary to a thorough and searching in-
vestigation of the truth. Should the parties to 
a cause be placed in fear of suits for libel or 
slander for reflections cast upon parties or others, 
. . . the trial of civil causes would be far less 
likely to lead to correct results than where such 
. embarassment [sic] was not felt. Perfect free-
dom to say in their pleadings whatever the par-
ties choose to bring to the consideration of the 
court or jury tends obviously to promote the in-
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telligent administration of justice. The attain-
ment of this result is of much greater importance 
than the prevention of evils arising from reflec-
tions on parties or others in the course of an 
action. 
Absolute Immunity in Defamation, supra, at 477-478. 
A. Absolute Privilege In Connection With A 
Judicial Proceeding Is Not Limited to State-
ments Made While A Proceeding Is Actually 
Pending. 
Because absolute privilege rests upon considerations 
of public policy, courts have not limited its scope to state-
ments made during trial. Absolute privilege has been 
accorded to a Justice's written opinion, Dodge v. Henriod, 
21 Utah 2d 277, 444 P.2d 753 (1968) (Ellett, J., con-
curring), to a statement by an attorney or his client in 
a complaint, Reliance Ins. Co. v. Hollins, 16 Utah 2d 44, 
395 P.2d 537 (1964), to a statement in an affidavit sup-
porting an application for a search warrant, Stone v. 
Hutchinson Daily News, 125 Kan. 715, 266 P. 78 (1928), 
and to an answer made in a deposition. Beezley v. Han-
sen, 4 Utah 2d 64, 286 P.2d 1057 (1955). 
In Albertson v. Raboff, 46 Cal. 2d 375, 295 P.2d 405 
(1956), the Court held that the recordation of a defama-
tory notice of lis pendens, even though made outside the 
courtroom and involving no function of the Court or its 
officers, was absolutely privileged. The Court stated: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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If the publication has a reasonable relation to 
the action and is permitted by law, the absolute 
privilege attaches. 
295 P. 2d at 409. Accord, Stewart v. Fahey, 14 Ariz. App. 
149, 481 P.2d 519 (1971); Smith v. Hatch, 271 Cal. App. 
2d 39, 76 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1969). 
Indeed the necessity of free speech to a thorough 
administration of justice has resulted in this court hold-
ing that a statement by an attorney during a consulta-
tion with his client, regarding a pending divorce suit, is 
absolutely privileged, Beezley v. Hansen, supra, and a 
statement by an attorney to opposing counsel made im-
mediately after the taking of a deposition is similarly 
privileged. Western States Title Ins. Co. v. Warnock, 
supra. Communications between counsel following a trial 
and concerning the possibility of an appeal were likewise 
held absolutely privilege in Rodgers v. Wise, 193 S. C. 
5, 7 S.E.2d 517 (1940), wherein the court stated: 
If attorneys cannot freely and frankly discuss 
their client's business between themselves, by 
word of mouth when they are face to face, or 
by letter when separated, and thereby evaluate 
and determine their client's rights, then . . . the 
rights of all clients before the Courts are seri-
ously endangered and the administration of jus-
tice is handicapped. 
7 S. E. 2d at 517. 
The leading case is Johnston v. Cartwright, 355 F. 
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2d 32 (8th Cir. 1966) (Iowa law), involving allegedly 
defamatory utterances of an attorney at a time when 
no judicial proceeding was pending. A false story about 
Johnston, a regional director for the United Auto Work-
ers ("UAW"), was published in a newspaper during the 
heat of an election campaign by the UAW to replace a 
union already representing the employees of Kiowa Cor-
poration ("Kiowa"). Cartwright was counsel for Kiowa 
and for the newspaper. After the election, the newspaper 
printed a retraction concerning the story and when Cart-
wright was asked about the story, he stated, "The story 
came to us on pretty good authority . . . I'm not at lib-
erty to divulge where it came from". 355 F. 2d at 34. 
This statement was also published in the newspaper. 
When Johnston brought suit against Cartwright, Kiowa 
and the newspaper, the District Court held that Cart-
wright's words were absolutely privileged. On appeal, 
Circuit Judge (now Justice) Blackmun stated: 
It is true that [Cartwrigbt's statement] was not 
uttered at the precise moment litigation be-
tween Cartwright or his client Kiowa or his news-
paper client, on the one hand, and the UAW or 
Johnston, on the other, was pending or when 
judicial control was immediately at hand. But 
it was made when the heat of the controversy 
remained, when the board [N. L. R. B.] election 
was just concluded, and when an accusation of 
falsity and libel and a challenge to prove, obvi-
ously communicated to Cartwright, had been 
made by a representative of the UAW. All signs 
Pointed to incipient litigation and to the neces-
sity for protective action . . . [Cartwright] was 
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mindful of a probable suit against his client . . . 
[and the statement] was made in the course of 
his professional office . . . in connection with pos-
sible litigation. (Emphasis added.) 
355 F. 2d at 37. 
Thus, it is clear that the cloak of absolute privilege 
is not conditioned upon the formalism of filing a com-
plaint, but is based upon a public policy which demands 
open communication and candor when litigation appears 
imminent and an attorney is called upon to present the 
claims or defenses of one of the adverse parties. 
B. Limitations On Absolute Privilege In Con-
nection With Judicial Proceedings. 
Courts have not permitted persons to use absolute 
privilege to protect themselves from liability for defama-
tory statements which are concerned with matters to-
tally outside the scope of pending or impending litigation. 
The English common-law rule covered any utterance 
reasonably related to a judicial proceeding, even though 
the statement was irrelevant to any of the issues. 
BOWER, ACTIONABLE DEFAMATION 91-92 (2d ed. 
1923). American Courts are said to have restricted the 
rule so that an "entirely foreign and irrelevant defama-
tion" may be actionable. PROSSER, TORTS 778-79 (4th 
ed. 1971); 50 AM. JUR. 2d, Libel and Slander, Section 
236. Nevertheless, an utterance is considered relevant to 
a proceeding if it has some relation or reference to the 
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subject of inquiry. Johnston v. Schlarb, 7 Wash. 2d 528, 
110 R2d 190, 195 (1941); 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS, 
Sections 585-589 (1938). According to Professor Prosser, 
"all doubts [are] resolved in favor of the defendant — a 
conclusion which seems in effect to adopt the English 
rule". Prosser, supra at 779. 
A typical application of the American rule is found 
in Richeson v. Kessler, 73 Idaho 548, 255 P. 2d 707 (1953), 
which involved a defamatory letter written by an attor-
ney to a Disitrict Judge and three interested attorneys, 
concerning a brief filed by an attorney whom the letter-
writer had replaced. In holding that the letter was an 
absolutely privileged statement, the Court noted: 
Expressing objections and requesting action in 
the form of a letter to a District Judge, and 
serving copies of the same on other counsel is 
a customary practice well recognized and often 
followed. The letter was written with reference 
and relation to the subject matter of the cause 
being litigated . . . Proceedings connected with 
judicature . . . are so important to the public 
good it is only in extreme cases and circum-
stances that a libelous publication in a judicial 
proceeding can be used as the basis for damages 
in a libel suit. 
255 P. 2d at 708-709. 
Thus, it appears that an "entirely foreign and irrele-
vant defamation" is not privileged, but that a defama-
tory statement which has some relation or reference to 
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the subject matter of a pending or contemplated action 
is protected. 
Within these limitations, it is clear that the case 
upon which Plaintiffs rely in their Brief herein, Union 
Mut. L. Ins. Co. v. Thomas, 83 F. 803 (9th Cir. 1897), 
is a properly decided case. (Appellants' Brief at 9). Der-
ogation of the character of the attorneys who filed a life 
insurance suit is certainly a foreign and irrelevant defa-
mation; the character of the attorneys had nothing at 
all to do with the pending suit. The case is, of course, 
distinguishable from this present Action because the 
demand letter written by Defendants' attorney was writ-
ten with reference to the disputes pending before the 
federal court and was concerned with the continuation 
of those disputes at the Shareholders' Meeting and pos-
sible litigation resulting therefrom. The letter was not 
an "entirely foreign and irrelevant defamation". 
C. Utah Law Is Not Contrary To The Fore-
going Summary Of The Law. 
Appropriate Utah cases have been noted above and 
they uphold Defendants' contentions as to the applicable 
law. Indeed, this Court has previously cited with ap-
proval 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS, Section 586 and 
Comment A. thereto (1938), which state: 
An attorney at law is absolutely privileged 
to publish false and defamatory matter of an-
other in communications preliminary to a pro-
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posed judicial proceeding, or in the institution 
of, or during the course and as a part of a judi-
cial proceeding in which he participates as coun-
sel, if it has some relation thereto. 
• • • 
[The attorney's purpose in publishing the 
defamation and his knowledge of the falsity of 
the matter] are of importance only in determin-
ing the amenability of the attorney to the disci-
plinary power of the court of which he is an 
officer. 
See Beezley v. Hansen, supra. 
Plaintiffs intimate that the Legislature may have 
changed the foregoing rules by enacting 5A UTAH CODE 
ANN. Section 45-2-3(2) (1953), which provides: 
A privileged publication which shall not be 
considered as libelous per se, is one made 
(2) In any publication of or any statement 
made in any legislative or judicial proceeding, 
or in any other official proceeding authorized by 
law. 
This statute is contained in Title 45 of the Code, 
entitled "Newspapers and Radio Broadcasting". Section 
45-2-3 deals with a "privileged publication" and Section 
45-2-10, which is almost identical, deals with a "privileged 
broadcast". These statutes do not seek to define a "judi-
cial proceeding", in the context of an attorney's absolute 
privilege but to establish the qualified privilege of a 
newspaper, radio broadcaster, or other publisher to re-
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port statements made in official proceedings, whether 
or not the statements would otherwise be libelous per 
se. See Prosser, supra at 830-33. 
D. Application Of Law To The Facts Of This 
Oase. 
This present Action is well within the rule as applied 
by Justice Blackmun in Johnston v. Cartwright, supra, 
and as stated in 3 RESTATEMENT, TORTS Section 586 
(1938). Indeed, cases involving facts similar to this case 
have arisen in Ohio and New Mexico and both courts held 
against the Plaintiffs on the question of absolute privi-
lege. 
In Theiss v. Scherer, 396 F.2d 646, 36 A.L.R. 3d 
1321 (6th Cir. 1968) (Ohio Law), an attorney wrote an 
allegedly defamatory letter to another attorney, regard-
ing a possible will contest, at a time when administration 
proceedings were pending. Copies of the letter were sent 
to persons interested in the estate. The District Court 
dismissed the Complaint for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief could be granted. On appeal, the dismissal 
was affirmed, the Court of Appeals holding that the 
letter was an absolutely privileged communication. 
The New Mexico case, Romero v. Prince, 85 N. M. 
474, 513 P.2d 717 (Ct. App. 1973), involved a dispute 
between brother and sister over a tract of land. The 
sister, acting as administratrix for her parents' estate, 
filed suit against her brother in 1968. In 1970, the sister 
leased the land to a rancher who was later informed by 
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the brother that the estate did not have title to the land. 
The rancher consulted with the attorney who represented 
the brother in the title suit and, in May, 1971, the 
brother's attorney sent a letter concerning the dispute 
and requesting an accounting to the attorney for the 
estate, with a copy to the rancher. The sister and her 
husband then brought suit against the brother's attorney 
alleging among other things that the letter was libelous 
of them. The trial court granted summary judgment 
for the defendant, and, the Court of Appeals, assuming 
the statements in the letter were libelous per se, affirmed. 
The appellate court held that the brother's attorney was 
absolutely privileged, in connection with a pending title 
suit and a possible action for an accminting, to send the 
letter wncerning his client's interest, to opposing coun-
sel and to an interested party. 
The demand letter involved in the instant case was 
written by Defendants' attorney in his capacity and office 
as counsel for Defendants. The circumstances in which 
the letter was written were wholly the result of disputes 
within the corporation which resulted in the filing of the 
federal suit. The Shareholders' Meeting was adjourned 
sine die because of the continuation of those disputes 
during the election of directors. The demand letter re-
ferred to the pending federal suit no less than six times 
(See Record at 4-8), and also referred to the possibility 
of additional litigation. 
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Clearly this is a case where not only was litigation 
actually pending to which the writing of the demand 
letter was related, but but also where all indications at 
the time pointed to the necessity for protective action 
and a probable additional suit, and where the statement 
made by the attorney was made in the course of his pro-
fessional office. 
POINT II. 
AN ATTORNEY'S CLIENT IS ACCORDED 
THE SAME PRIVILEGE AS THE ATTOR-
NEY IN CONNECTION WITH A PENDING 
OR POSSIBLE ACTION. 
Plaintiffs may have sought to avoid the problems 
associated with the absolute privilege accorded to an 
attorney's statements in a judicial proceeding by naming 
the Defendants as the responsible parties' defendant. 
However, it has been consistently held that the privilege 
of parties to a judicial proceeding is co-extensive with 
that of counsel. Mr. Justice Cardozo, while sitting on the 
New York Court of Appeals, stated: 
There is no difference in respect of a degree be-
tween the privilege of counsel and that of parties 
and witnesses. They are phases of the same im-
munity. 
Andrews v. Gardiner, 224 N. Y. 440, 121 N.E. 431, 343 
(1918); accord, Thourot v. Hartnett, 56 N. J. Super. 306, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17 
152 A.2d 858 (1959); Robinson v. Home Fire & Marine 
Ins. Co., 242 Iowa 1120, 49 N.W. 2d 521 (1957); Gins-
berg v. Black, 192 F.2d 823 (7th Cir. 1951), cert, denied, 
343 U.S. 934 (1952) (Kentucky law). 
Chief Justice Shaw, speaking for the Supreme Judi-
cial Court of Massachusetts, in Hoar v. Wood, 44 Mass. 
(3 Met.) 193 (1841) gave the reasoning for the co-exten-
sive privilege: 
We can perceive no substantial difference be-
tween the case of counsel and that of a party. 
The privilege is extended to the counsel for the 
interest and benefit of the party, and to allow 
him full scope and freedom in the support or 
defense of the rights of the party. 
44 Mass. at 193. 
CONCLUSION 
The summary judgment granted by the Lower Court 
should be affirmed because: 
(1) The allegedly defamatory letter was written 
by Defendants' attorney in his office as counsel and in 
relation to pending and impending judicial proceedings, 
and the letter was sent solely to interested parties; there-
fore, the letter was an absolutely privilege communica-
tion. 
(2) The absolute privilege of parties being co-ex-
tensives with that of their counsel, Defendants cannot 
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be held liable in an action for damages for words written 
by their attorney in relation to a judicial proceeding. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PARSONS, KRUSE 
& CROWTHER 
By THOMAS N. CROWTHER 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Kenneth D. Lawson 
and Ray M. Unrath 
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